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Abstract 29 
Debates concerning social learning in the behavioral and the developmental cognitive sciences have 30 
largely ignored the literature on social influence in the affective sciences despite having arguably the 31 
same object of study. We argue that this is a mistake and that no complete model of social learning can 32 
exclude an affective aspect. In addition, we argue that affect can allow bridging of the debates of the 33 
unique characteristics of social learning in humans compared to other animals. We first review the two 34 
major bodies of literature in non-human animals and human development, highlighting the fact that the 35 
former has adopted a behavioral approach while the latter has adopted a cognitive approach, leading to 36 
irreconcilable differences. We then introduce a novel framework, affective social learning (ASL), that 37 
studies the way we learn about value(s). We show that all three approaches are complementary and 38 
focus, respectively, on behavior towards, cognitions concerning, and feelings about objects, events and 39 
people in our environment. All three thus contribute to an affective, behavioral and cognitive story of 40 
knowledge transmission: the ABC of social learning. In particular, ASL can provide the backbone of 41 
an integrative approach to social learning. We argue that this novel perspective on social learning can 42 
allow both evolutionary continuity and ontogenetic development by lowering the cognitive thresholds 43 
that appear often too complex for other species and non-verbal infants. Yet, it can also explain some of 44 
the major achievements only found in human cultures.  45 
 46 
Keywords: affect; affective social learning; behavioral processes; cognition; culture; social learning 47 
  48 
THE ABC OF SOCIAL LEARNING 
  3 
Introduction 49 
 50 
Social learning is at the heart of knowledge transmission and culture formation in many animal species, 51 
including humans. However, while most of the relevant research in non-human animals (henceforth, 52 
‘animals’) has remained at the behavioral level, presumably for fear of anthropomorphism (J. Panksepp, 53 
2011b), the relevant research in humans has been mostly understood from a cognitive point of view, 54 
even from a very early age. To illustrate this, one can look at the acquisition of tool use in children and 55 
other animals: both learn that a tool is a particular object, but only a child is likely to learn that the tool 56 
has been made by someone to achieve a particular goal (German and Defeyter, 2003). Given the 57 
underlying cognitive implications of this second step, particularly in terms of cognitive representations 58 
(Gruber, Zuberbühler, Clément, & van Schaik, 2015), it is difficult to apply the same theoretical 59 
framework to animals. Furthermore, the transfer of this knowledge is thought to rely on specifically 60 
cognitive social learning mechanisms and processes, including imitation and teaching, where a 61 
connection between model and learner is needed (Haun & Over, 2013). But the establishment of such 62 
connections between two human beings most likely relies on affect, in the form of an emotional bond. 63 
Yet, affects have remained almost absent from the social learning literature and debates, and are still to 64 
be fully accepted by comparative psychologists as worthy of scientific study at all (de Waal, 2011). 65 
Thus, crudely put, while there seems to be two stories of social learning, one behavioral and animal, the 66 
other more cognitive and human, there may be good reason to believe the addition of a human, affective 67 
component would drive these two stories further apart.  68 
 69 
However, in this article, we will not only argue for a rapprochement of these two parallel lines of 70 
research, we will also argue that social learning processes largely rely on affect, and that the latter is 71 
central to the learning process across species. In fact, affect may even provide an evolutionary bridging 72 
chapter, a chapter which points the way to a fully integrated affective, behavioral and cognitive story 73 
of social learning that includes both humans and animals. We will argue that social learning constantly 74 
requires feedback from other individuals (e.g. a parent’s admonishing scowl or a partner’s encouraging 75 
hug), and that emotion is the most common and effective form of this type of feedback (Clément & 76 
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Dukes, 2020). In other words, other individuals’ expressions can elicit particular and specific cognitions 77 
and behaviors, leading perhaps to learning something about the object, the context, or even the expresser 78 
herself (Hareli & Hess, 2010). It is generally understood by affective scientists that emotion motivates 79 
behavior and cognition, and to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine a model of human behavior 80 
or cognition that would not benefit from including affective processes. 81 
 82 
One recent advance in this direction specifically concerns the interplay between behavior, cognition 83 
and emotion in acquiring cultural knowledge. Ultimately and more broadly, when a relatively tightly 84 
interconnected group of people provide the same information – that talking with your mouth full is bad, 85 
that you should support the reds but not the blues, or that the Catskills are worthy of a visit, for example 86 
– that group’s values are transmitted, and the receiver of that information has socially learned that 87 
particular culture’s values (Clément & Dukes, 2013). This affective social learning (ASL) organizes 88 
various mechanisms of cognition and behavior, including emotional contagion, affective observation, 89 
social referencing and natural pedagogy along an axis of intentionality (Clément & Dukes, 2017), and 90 
appears particularly suited for broad use across developmental, social and comparative psychology 91 
(Dukes & Clément, 2019). 92 
 93 
We believe that it is high time to connect the field of emotion to the behavioral and cognitive fields of 94 
social learning, and that the ASL framework can offer both continuity with other species and reasons 95 
to explain our own uniqueness. For example, it allows us to study how similar a chimpanzee juvenile 96 
observing a dominant individual’s reaction before crossing a dangerous tarmac road is to a child trying 97 
to figure out from her siblings whether crossing a busy Manhattan intersection is safe; as well as how 98 
such behavior can become a socially shared feature of the given community displaying it. Hence, 99 
adopting a broad approach towards what social influences are, and the manners in which they influence 100 
others across species by learning through emotions, may offer a way to repair the evolutionary 101 
discontinuity between human cognitive social learning and animal behavioral learning. We will point 102 
out that in the search of the origins of social learning, traditionally, social influences can be split along 103 
three lines: behavioral social learning, cognitive social learning (Part 1); and emotional social 104 
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appraisal (Part 2). We will argue that these distinctions may not be so clear, as all three could highlight 105 
a different focus on the effects that others have on us, respectively, on our behavior towards, cognitions 106 
concerning, and feelings about objects, events and people in our environment. Throughout the article, 107 
it will become explicit that these notions often collide and overlap. Indeed, generally-speaking, affective 108 
scientists would agree that a clear distinction between the cognitive, the behavioral and the affective is 109 
complicated: most definitions of “emotion” would in fact include both cognitive and behavioral aspects 110 
(Sander, 2013). This is also reflected in recent animal studies, when, compared to early behaviorist 111 
approaches, behavioral outputs are often taken as evidence of cognitive processes (see below). We will 112 
therefore strive to describe the different traditions of social learning by highlighting their focus of 113 
interest, while acknowledging that the other dimensions are often present and interrelated. Yet, by 114 
arguing that the affective dimension has remained neglected, we will describe how social learning could 115 
be defined more broadly than is usually the case, encompassing Affect, Behavior and Cognition – an 116 
ABC story of social learning. Adopting such an approach allows us to explore new paths, which may 117 
have led our species to its unique characteristics. Thus, in the final part of this paper, we will show that 118 
the affective dimension can be integrated in models of the evolution of culture and language, providing 119 
further clues to explaining the uniqueness of humans. Yet, first and foremost, a re-appraisal of the 120 
literature is warranted to join these three lines of research that have seemingly ignored each other, to 121 
the detriment of all three. With a view to highlighting touching points between them, this re-appraisal 122 
will be presented in terms of the increasing intentionality displayed by the learners and knowers to 123 
receive and transmit knowledge, beginning with something close to a contagion, involving minimal 124 
intentions to teach or learn, and culminating with consideration of an active, highly intentional 125 
transmission of cultural knowledge. 126 
 127 
Part 1: Traditions of social learning 128 
 129 
The two major traditions of social learning have aimed to understand how animals acquire knowledge 130 
in their respective environments (Zentall & Galef, 1988), and how children acquire their knowledge 131 
and language (Tomasello, 1999). The point of this section is not to review the sometimes bitter debates 132 
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that have fueled the growing literature, particularly with respect to the specific mechanisms at work 133 
(Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009), neither to 134 
claim that the animal social learning literature is exclusively behavioral nor that the developmental 135 
literature is exclusively cognitive. Yet, by exploring the major conceptual advances made in both 136 
domains, we aim to show that they have, for the most part, followed different theoretical paths. Because 137 
we are mostly concerned with the acquisition of cultural knowledge, we will not specifically focus on 138 
the adult human social learning literature, although we will address the relevant papers when necessary.  139 
 140 
The behavioral animal social learning tradition 141 
 142 
The animal social learning tradition is rooted in research on behavior, as behavior is the only measurable 143 
unit when assessing beings that cannot communicate directly about their goals and beliefs with 144 
experimenters. This section will summarize many of the main ideas expressed concerning animal social 145 
learning, from Pavlovian associative learning to more cognitively grounded approaches. It will conclude 146 
by showing that animal social learning research remains rooted in behavioral explanations, mostly 147 
defined in terms of what it is missing when compared to human social learning, and characterized as 148 
lacking some high-fidelity copying mechanisms, claimed to be human-specific, such as imitation and 149 
teaching. 150 
 151 
From Pavlov to the social world 152 
It may be somewhat unusual to start a discussion on animal social learning by referring to Pavlovian 153 
conditioning. Yet, by frontally opposing the notion of instinct nearly seventy years ago, reference to 154 
Pavlovian conditioning started a tradition of animal learning (Krause & Domjan, 2017) which continues 155 
to shape discussions of animal traditions and cultures today. Lehrman (1953)’s attack on the use of the 156 
word instinct triggered a revolution in our understanding of animal behavior, leading to the 157 
abandonment of a split between instinctive versus learned behavior (Bateson & Mameli, 2007; Marler, 158 
2004). This provided the impetus for a theory of associative learning to emerge, built on a Pavlovian 159 
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conditioning paradigm: while displaying genetic adaptations characterizing their species, animals must 160 
display enough flexibility to react to their environment in real time, thereby demonstrating a faculty for 161 
learning. The Pavlovian approach rests on Unconditioned Stimuli, which do not require prior training 162 
or learning, either posing direct threats to survival (e.g. predatory attack), or sustaining survival (e.g. 163 
food, water), so long as Unconditioned Responses are elicited (e.g. fighting or fleeing). Pavlovian 164 
conditioning allows the pairing of a Conditioned Response to a Conditioned Stimulus or context paired 165 
with an Unconditioned Stimulus. An example of Pavlovian conditioning could be Diana monkeys in 166 
the Taï Forest learning the alarm calls of birds for “leopard” and therefore enhancing their own survival 167 
by reacting adaptively upon hearing such calls (Zuberbuhler, 2000). While a review of the specifics of 168 
Pavlovian conditioning is outside the scope of the present article, it is interesting for our purpose to note 169 
that much of the literature on animal learning has been articulated about rewards, particularly food-170 
based, possibly because it is the easiest to implement in laboratory settings (Schultz, 2006); these 171 
rewards elicit a positive affective learning experience. In addition, other relevant notions found in the 172 
affective literature (see also Box 1) tied to conditioning are those of approach and withdrawal behavior, 173 
as well as motivational valence, which condition whether an animal will increase or decrease a behavior 174 
in light of a pleasing or aversive outcome (Schultz, 2006). For example, in the words of Schultz (2006), 175 
“punishers induce negative emotional states of anger, fear, and panic” (p.94), which influence learning. 176 
The latter also occurs in social contexts (J. B. Panksepp & Panksepp, 2017), and beyond the context of 177 
the laboratory, as described in the next section. 178 
 179 
Social learning mechanisms in animals  180 
Despite the power of individual learning, one of the advantages of social life is to witness others 181 
experiencing something without having to bear the consequences (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). For 182 
example, in the case of a first encounter with a leopard, one may not be offered a second chance to 183 
interpret the warning call correctly. The impact of associative learning has shaped both discussions of 184 
animal and human individual learning and social learning (Bandura, 1977; Shettleworth, 1998). There 185 
is still fierce debate concerning which social learning mechanisms are available to animals, with most 186 
organigrams establishing a hierarchy of social learning processes that include human-specific 187 
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mechanisms not available to other animals. Such theoretical positioning has implications for whether 188 
we can grant the ability to possess and maintain culture(s) to other animals, if culture is dependent on 189 
particular social learning mechanisms, such as imitation or teaching (see discussion in Gruber, 2016). 190 
In this respect, stimulus and local enhancement only position themselves one step ahead of associative 191 
learning, although they display a crucial characteristic: they happen in a social context. An animal is 192 
triggered to approach a location or a stimulus because another animal was or is still currently engaging 193 
with a particular food for example. Yet, both animals individually develop a behavior in response to the 194 
stimulus, with little to no attention paid to what the other one is doing. Such triggers may be sufficient 195 
for animals to express behavior that otherwise may qualify as cultural if the correct ecological and social 196 
environments are present, but would nevertheless fall short of what is usually required to instantiate 197 
human cultural behavior (Tennie, et al., 2009). Following such reasoning, if population-specific 198 
behavioral differences documented between chimpanzee communities (Whiten et al., 1999) can be 199 
explained by low-level stimulus enhancement or local enhancement, these cultural differences have 200 
little to do with the more cognitively acquired human cultures (Tennie, et al., 2009).  201 
 202 
Other theorists disagree with this view (e.g. Whiten et al., 2009) and argue that observational learning 203 
is necessary for some behavior to emerge. The two main processes described in the literature consist of 204 
emulation and imitation. The definition of emulation has varied in the literature (see review in Galef & 205 
Whiten, 2017), from affordance learning to the more recently acknowledged use of the term, goal 206 
imitation. In such cases, an individual will only imitate the end result, but will not copy the behavioral 207 
form of the action (Bandini & Tennie, 2017). Indeed, emulation emphasizes the instrumental action 208 
outcome without much regard to the process of how the goal was achieved (Whiten, et al., 2009). There 209 
are other debates about what constitutes imitation in the literature, from the distinctions between 210 
program-level and production-level imitation (Byrne, 2002), to the necessity of pairing Theory of Mind 211 
(ToM) with behavioral imitation to obtain ‘true’ imitation (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 212 
2005), exemplifying the fact that the borders between behavioral and cognitive learning become ever 213 
more blurred. We believe that strong cognitive demands can be made when defining some terms, but 214 
that equal ground should be granted in their use, irrelevant of the species considered, to avoid confusion. 215 
THE ABC OF SOCIAL LEARNING 
  9 
For example, many human developmental studies use the word ‘imitation’ when referring to tasks that 216 
may not be considered ‘imitation’ in the animal literature (e.g. Li, Liao, Cheng, & He, 2019). Thus, the 217 
impression that there is widespread presence of some mechanisms in humans but only limited presence 218 
in other animals might, at least in part, be explained by semantic differences, rather than differences in 219 
the way things actually are.  220 
 221 
One uncontroversial claim is that there is limited teaching in animals. Evidence of animal teaching can 222 
be found if a functional biological definition is used (Caro & Hauser, 1992), illustrated by famous 223 
examples, such as meerkat scorpion hunting behavior (with adult individuals disabling preys for their 224 
youngs, Thornton & McAuliffe, 2006). Another interesting example is found in the domestic chicken, 225 
where research provides potential evidence for a large range of social learning mechanisms, including 226 
some form of teaching (Daisley, Rosa Salva, Regolin, & Vallortigara, 2011). For example, Nicol and 227 
Pope (1996) showed that hens would increase the rate of ground scratching – when no food was 228 
available – and of palatable food pecking, without ingesting it, therefore increasing “maternal food 229 
display” (p.772), if they observed chicks feeding on seemingly unpalatable food (unknown to the hen, 230 
the food was in fact palatable). Nevertheless, there is little evidence in the literature of human-like 231 
intentional teaching (see below) in other animals. However, recent data from wild chimpanzees may 232 
challenge the scientific doxa on the absence of this type of teaching. At Goualougou, Republic of 233 
Congo, chimpanzee mothers exhibit more directional scaffolding, including direct transmission of a 234 
tool in the context of termite fishing, than chimpanzees in Gombe, Tanzania (Musgrave et al., 2020). 235 
Crucially, the former community displays a more complex tool set to transmit than the latter. These 236 
findings can not only be added to the growing evidence that social learning mechanisms are at the heart 237 
of the transmission of culture in animals (Allen, Weinrich, Hoppitt, & Rendell, 2013; Hobaiter, Poisot, 238 
Zuberbühler, Hoppitt, & Gruber, 2014), but also demonstrate that further work is needed to uncover 239 
potential forms of teaching in our closest relatives and other animals.  240 
 241 
The cognitive developmental social learning tradition                             242 
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Social learning strategies in human children 243 
This human social learning tradition is rooted in research on cognitive mechanisms underlying 244 
children’s learning from social partners, in particular cognitions regarding children’s epistemic 245 
evaluations of objects, events or social partners in their social environments. These evaluations allow 246 
children to identify people who can provide reliable information or explain ambiguous events to make 247 
appropriate decisions. Infancy presents a unique period for quickly and efficiently accomplishing a 248 
large amount of learning about the physical and social world. Children’s cognitive development relies 249 
both on their first-hand exploration and on their interaction with others. Two metaphors have been used 250 
to explain children’s impressive rate of knowledge acquisition: the child as a ‘little scientist’ – an 251 
autonomous explorer guided by experimentation, hypothesis testing and causal learning motivations 252 
(Gopnik, 2012; Piaget, 1952), and the child as a ‘little anthropologist’ (Legare & Harris, 2016; 253 
Vygotsky, 1987) – a social agent embedded in the societal structure which allows for rapid and effective 254 
learning of accumulated knowledge from others. At the core of cultural transmission is the infant’s 255 
capacity to flexibly and effectively engage in a variety of social learning strategies, such as observation, 256 
active information solicitation, and pedagogy (Caldwell, Schillinger, Evans, & Hopper, 2012; Kendal 257 
et al., 2018).  258 
 259 
Importantly, variations between cultures are also observed in the way children acquire their cultural 260 
knowledge, particularly with respect to imitation and the reliance on didactic pedagogy (Legare, 2017). 261 
Therefore, in line with a push towards less Western-centered psychology (Henrich, Heine, & 262 
Norenzayan, 2010; Kline, Shamsudheen, & Broesch, 2018), there have been calls in developmental 263 
psychology to increase the pool of tested infant and children populations (Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & 264 
Legare, 2017). It is also important to recognize that many of the theories of human social learning based 265 
on a small subset of the human global population have been “created, reviewed and edited” (Kline, et 266 
al., 2018, p.2) by researchers from the same cultural crucible as their study population. While we 267 
acknowledge that our subsequent review will necessarily suffer from the same bias because of the 268 
paucity of data from non-Western, educated, industrialized, rich, developed (WEIRD) countries, we 269 
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very much welcome current efforts to expand the datasets on which theory of human development are 270 
built, and will refer to studies with non-WEIRD samples in the subsequent paragraphs when possible.  271 
 272 
In the following, we cover two particularly developed human cognitive strategies in social learning: 273 
active social learning (through explicit information seeking and information transmission) and selective 274 
social learning (through early emerging sensitivity to others’ cues of reliability, accuracy, confidence 275 
and credibility, as well as informants’ own characteristics). 276 
 277 
Active social learning  278 
While children visually and manually explore their environment, track patterns, test hypotheses, make 279 
inferences, and revise beliefs based on accumulated evidence (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Schulz, 2012; 280 
Shafto, Goodman, & Frank, 2012), most of their information gathering in real life occurs in social 281 
contexts. Direct observation of others is guided by the infant learner’s attentional mechanisms and 282 
allows them to acquire new information about their environment. This information could probably have 283 
been discovered on their own at a later date, but social learning facilitates more efficient sharing of 284 
knowledge among conspecifics (Galef & Whiten, 2017; Paradise & Rogoff, 2009). The primary social 285 
learning strategies are imitation and emulation. As excellent imitators, children can copy with high 286 
fidelity a sequence of actions demonstrated by another person to achieve a goal (Nielsen, 2006; Want 287 
& Harris, 2002). While recent studies dispute the existence of neo-natal imitation (Oostenbroek et al., 288 
2016; Slaughter, 2021), that humans are masters of imitation and the best at acquiring cultural 289 
information in this way is beyond doubt (Call, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Meltzoff, 2007). In 290 
addition, only humans ‘overimitate’ (but see Huber, Popovová, Riener, Salobir, & Cimarelli, 2018), 291 
routinely and faithfully copying actions demonstrated in experimental paradigms, even those that are 292 
causally and explicitly irrelevant to success in a given task (Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan, 293 
Makinson, & Whiten, 2011). At first sight, this excess of time and energy spent copying others appears 294 
to be wasteful behavior, affording no particular evolutionary advantage. Yet, overimitation extends 295 
beyond goal-directed actions (for a review, see Hoehl et al., 2019): motivation to overimitate has been 296 
provided by cognitive explanations, such as causal understanding (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007), and 297 
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more recently, by socio-emotional explanations such as the desire to affiliate with others (Over & 298 
Carpenter, 2013) or normativity (Keupp, Behne, Zachow, Kasbohm, & Rakoczy, 2015). Having 299 
multiple non-exclusive explanatory factors (Frick, Clément, & Gruber, 2017; Schleihauf & Hoehl, 300 
2020) is useful in framing the social learning debate, and simultaneously underlines that much remains 301 
to be done to satisfactorily explain our unique capacities for acquiring information from others through 302 
imitation. For example, there are noted differences between cultures in terms of overimitation (Nielsen 303 
& Tomaselli, 2010), which suggests a learnt component to imitation (Heyes, 2018). 304 
 305 
Children can also obtain knowledge from others who are willing and able to share what they know via 306 
direct pedagogical instruction or intentional teaching. As compared to other social learning strategies, 307 
pedagogy, where knowledgeable individuals directly and intentionally ease the acquisition of 308 
information for naïve individuals through their behavior, facilitates acquisition of more complex 309 
knowledge and skills (Morgan et al., 2015; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015). Obvious examples across 310 
cultures include motherese (Broesch & Bryant, 2015; Fernald, 1985) and motionese (Brand, Baldwin, 311 
& Ashburn, 2002) whereby adults will talk and move in a way that makes it clear to the child that they 312 
are being addressed and that there might be something to learn (Clément & Dukes, 2017). A theory of 313 
Instructed Learning (Tomasello, 2016) argues that this social learning process evolved, not only to 314 
enable knowledge transfer, but also to establish common ground and social coherence. A theory of 315 
Natural Pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 2011) proposes that humans are uniquely predisposed to 316 
learn from social partners who display ostensive communicative cues, which signal transmission of 317 
generic and generalizable knowledge. Infants’ early sensitivity to these cues indicates their readiness to 318 
learn and treat this information differently. In particular, natural pedagogy allows children to acquire 319 
opaque knowledge, that is, knowledge where the immediate causal relations between elements are not 320 
readily clear. Other cognitive developmental theories similarly emphasize social facilitation of the 321 
learner’s input through apprenticeship, direct demonstration and feedback as teaching models (Rogoff 322 
et al., 1993; Vygotsky, 1987).  323 
 324 
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Despite the apparent dichotomy with active learning, social learning does not presume that children are 325 
passive receivers of knowledge. The social learning approach indeed presupposes observing and 326 
interacting with others to acquire information (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Csibra & Gergely, 327 
2009; Harris, 2012; Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). Knowledge 328 
exchange through a variety of social learning strategies then enables transmission of accumulated 329 
culture, from basic tool use to complex community rituals, passed on from one generation to another, 330 
from experts to novices, from adults to children. Hence, the active social learning approach incorporates 331 
the asocial (by means of individual experimenting) and social aspects as dual engines of knowledge 332 
acquisition and transmission. Here, children actively participate in the social knowledge exchange by 333 
integrating what they learned through first-hand exploration, observation, imitation, pedagogical 334 
instruction or seeking others’ testimony by querying them (Saylor & Ganea, 2018) – to “gather just the 335 
information they want, on just the topic that interests them, at just the time they require it” (Baldwin & 336 
Moses, 1996, p. 1934), and to propagate such knowledge to others. Even preverbal infants use 337 
information seeking gestures to solicit information from social partners, with their communicative 338 
strategies becoming more varied and complex with the mastery of language (for reviews, see Harris & 339 
Lane, 2014; Ronfard, Zambrana, Hermansen, & Kelemen, 2018). 340 
 341 
Children also participate in active social learning through actively transmitting knowledge themselves. 342 
Not only are children efficient recipients of others’ pedagogy, their own, early emerging teaching 343 
behaviors may be key to understanding the very nature of information transmission which enables 344 
cultural evolution (Strauss, Calero, & Sigman, 2014). Despite the paucity of empirical research on the 345 
ontogeny of teaching, studies have shown that infants start to engage in basic preverbal information 346 
transmission (e.g. by using informative pointing, Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008) and 347 
preschoolers spontaneously teach their younger siblings, who, in turn, spontaneously request teaching 348 
(Howe, Della Porta, Recchia, & Ross, 2016). Two-year-old children selectively transmit information 349 
about novel objects functions to ignorant adults upon request (Bazhydai, Silverstein, Parise, & 350 
Westermann, 2020; Vredenburgh, Kushnir, & Casasola, 2015). Preschoolers and older children exhibit 351 
an expanded teaching strategies toolkit, gradually becoming more contingent and selective in their 352 
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teaching, which is dependent on the development of mentalizing, metacognition, and executive function 353 
skills (Corriveau, Ronfard, & Cui, 2018; Gweon & Schulz, 2019). While the natural pedagogy theory 354 
described above does not directly address children’s own teaching abilities, it has been proposed that 355 
pedagogy as a teaching strategy should be applicable, both to adults and children themselves, and, as 356 
such, enables fast and efficient bi-directional transfer of culturally relevant knowledge (Strauss, et al., 357 
2014). In support, research has documented children’s own spontaneous use of ostensive cues when 358 
teaching others, including direct eye gaze, informing gestures, and contingent and verbally explicit 359 
signals (Calero, Zylberberg, Ais, Semelman, & Sigman, 2015; Flynn & Whiten, 2010).  360 
 361 
Selective social learning 362 
Posing requests for information to social partners allows children to direct their own acquisition of 363 
knowledge. As children engage in seeking information and in transmitting acquired evidence socially, 364 
their choice of social partner is often selective. This selectivity primarily manifests through sensitivity 365 
to others’ cues of reliability, accuracy, confidence and credibility, as well as informants’ age, ingroup 366 
status, endorsement by others, and deference to majority (Harris, 2012; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013); such 367 
selectivity may not be limited to humans, as other species, particularly great apes, enjoy extended 368 
childhoods in which they learn their own cultural repertoire from closely related models (Lamon, 369 
Neumann, Gruber, & Zuberbühler, 2017; Schuppli et al., 2016). Children are sensitive to others’ ability 370 
to provide useful information and take an interrogative stance towards them as sources of knowledge 371 
(Harris, Koenig, Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Understanding 372 
the ontogeny of selective social learning sheds light on the later developing, more complex accounts of 373 
selective trust in testimony (Clément, 2010; Harris, et al., 2018) and knowledge clustering (Danovitch 374 
& Keil, 2004). As early as 8 months of age, infants treat reliable information provided through social 375 
cues, such as human faces, differently to other symbolic but non-social cues, such as arrows 376 
(Tummeltshammer, Wu, Sobel, & Kirkham, 2014). Reliability and accuracy cues play an important role 377 
in infants interaction with social partners in their second year of life: they selectively choose to follow 378 
their gaze (Chow, Poulin-Dubois, & Lewis, 2008), reference them in emotionally ambiguous situations 379 
(Stenberg, 2003), look longer at them upon detecting their inaccurate testimony (Koenig & Echols, 380 
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2003), imitate their actions (Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Polonia, 2011; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, 381 
& Daum, 2010), and request labels for novel objects from them (Begus & Southgate, 2012). For 382 
instance, 12-month-olds have been shown to successfully distinguish the respective knowledgeability 383 
cues of available social partners, determine who is a better source of necessary information, and 384 
selectively refer to them when information is lacking, using pre-verbal communicative cues (Bazhydai, 385 
Westermann, & Parise, 2020).  386 
 387 
In addition to the epistemic indices, infants exhibit selectivity to social cues, preferentially learning 388 
from adults versus peers (Kachel, Moore, & Tomasello, 2018; Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, Nielsen, & 389 
Aschersleben, 2012) and from ingroup rather than outgroup members (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & 390 
Carpenter, 2013; Gruber, Deschenaux, Frick, & Clément, 2019). Demonstrating the increasing 391 
importance of social non-verbal credibility cues, 24-month-olds referentially learned from people who 392 
presented themselves as confident, rather than actually knowledgeable (Brosseau-Liard & Poulin-393 
Dubois, 2014). A recent set of meta-analyses reported that preschoolers exhibit selective trust based on 394 
both epistemic and social characteristics of the informants, with older children attributing more weight 395 
to the knowledge dimension rather than the social status (Tong, Wang, & Danovitch, 2020). 396 
Furthermore, with advances in cognitive development, preschoolers flexibly update their epistemic 397 
representations of informants in light of new evidence concerning their credibility, retrospectively 398 
revising acquired knowledge if necessary (Leech, Haber, Arunachalam, Kurkul, & Corriveau, 2019; 399 
Luchkina, Corriveau, & Sobel, 2020).    400 
 401 
Section summary                             402 
 403 
In this section, overall, we have shown that both the developmental and animal social literature, while 404 
sometimes intersecting, have followed different theoretical paths, particularly because of the difficulty 405 
in accessing animals’ minds. Conversely, research in human children (although dealing with equally 406 
inaccessible minds in infancy) appears to often grant highly developed cognitive abilities to its subjects, 407 
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particularly with respect to taking others’ perspectives, in line with claims of unique capabilities in their 408 
species such as ToM, imitation or teaching. Such conflicting theoretical positions have created a gap 409 
that threatens claims of continuity between humans and other animals. In addition, claims of 410 
universality remain to be tested with more non-WEIRD populations. Yet, a common point between the 411 
two traditions is that they have mostly ignored the field of the affective sciences. We believe this is a 412 
mistake, and that emotions may in fact constitute a missing bridge between the two traditions. Indeed, 413 
there is a large body of literature regarding social influence in affective sciences that may have escaped 414 
the attention of scientists in other fields, since it has not traditionally been framed in terms of social 415 
learning (Clément & Dukes, 2017; Dukes & Clément, 2017). Part 2 explores this aspect. 416 
 417 
Part 2: Emotions in social learning 418 
 419 
In a brief survey of possible systems of core social knowledge that is, innate systems that guide and 420 
navigate us in the social world throughout life, Spelke and colleagues (2013) identified three candidates: 421 
Natural Pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2011), Natural Similarity (Meltzoff, 2007) and Natural 422 
Cooperation (Tomasello, 2009). We believe that all these systems are strongly influenced by affect. 423 
Indeed, more generally, a strong case can be made that research in developmental social cognition has 424 
historically failed to sufficiently acknowledge how important infants’ understanding of others’ 425 
expressions is to interpersonal relationships (Reschke, Walle, & Dukes, 2017; see also Box 1). In fact, 426 
affect appears to underpin the social transmission of knowledge, whether in terms of these systems, or 427 
through a variety of situations such as the emotional bond between learner and knower highlighted in 428 
the introduction, or the selective trust involved in the social transmission of knowledge mentioned in 429 
the previous section. The interest, enthusiasm and the passion with which one learns, or the importance 430 
of a positive relationship between students and teachers could also be added to this list (Lee, 2012; 431 
Pekrun, 2017). Such relationships have in fact often been considered under a motivational approach in 432 
the educational literature (Ryan & Deci, 2020), reflecting “people’s inherent motivational propensities 433 
for learning and growing” (p.1). While motivation is here used in a different sense than in classic 434 
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affective theory1, it follows that all these approaches suggest a priori strong evidence that affect is at 435 
the heart of social learning. 436 
 437 
One way to consider the impact of other people’s emotions on our own cognitions and behaviors is in 438 
the form of social appraisal, where the social world has a direct impact on our evaluation of the objects 439 
in the environment (Manstead & Fischer, 2001). In short, when we appraise a particular object, 440 
especially one about which we are not sure how to feel – an ambiguous object - we integrate how other 441 
people appear to be appraising that object. Here an object can be a piece of art in a gallery for example, 442 
or a particular tool, but also an idea, another person or, in fact, any tangible or non-tangible 443 
phenomenon. As a major component of social appraisal (Clément & Dukes, 2017), social referencing, 444 
where learners directly seek affective evaluative information from more knowledgeable onlookers (e.g. 445 
whether the object is a threat or not) and behave accordingly (e.g. Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & 446 
Svejda, 1983), is also of interest because it can bridge ‘cognitively-demanding’ to ‘cognitively-simpler’ 447 
mechanisms (Gruber & Sievers, 2019). A number of classic studies (Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky, & 448 
Tidball, 2001; Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985; Zarbatany & Lamb, 1985), best exemplify 449 
what is typically referred to as social referencing. In particular, Sorce, et al. (1985) watched as 12-450 
month-olds approached what must have appeared to the infants as a cliff, but what in reality was a 451 
transparent covering, that led to an alluring toy. As the child decided to move towards the toy, she was 452 
significantly more likely to cross this ‘visual cliff’ when her mother expressed joy or interest than fear, 453 
for example. Infants were keen on checking in with their mothers, to socially reference them as it were, 454 
but only when the cliff was a certain depth. If the ‘cliff’ was either too deep or shallow, the children 455 
were likely to cross or stop, irrespective of the mother’s facial expression (Adolph, Kaplan, & Kretch, 456 
in press). 457 
 458 
In a recent theoretical study, Reschke and colleagues argued that to understand others’ emotions means 459 
understanding the relationship the others have to the objects in their environment, and their 460 
intentionality towards those goals (Reschke, Walle, & Dukes, 2020). Importantly, the authors 461 
encouraged going beyond traditional methods of imagining how affect is communicated (e.g. facial 462 
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expressions) to include, for example, a repeatedly failed but ultimately completed action (à la Meltzoff) 463 
as a sign first of frustration and then relief, or even pride. A reinterpretation of three classic 464 
developmental studies involving ToM (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009), altruistic helping 465 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) and behavioral re-enactment (Meltzoff, 1995) – including two of the 466 
systems surveyed by Spelke and colleagues – suggested examples of how important affect might be, 467 
even if each of those studies had either implicitly or explicitly discounted emotion as a factor. 468 
Importantly, Reschke and colleagues followed up by employing a modified version of the classic 469 
behavioral re-enactment procedure study, originally carried out by Meltzoff (1995). The results bridged 470 
research on infant social referencing and psychological reasoning, by indicating that 18-moth-old 471 
infants can reference an adult’s emotional expression to disambiguate a motivational state, and not just 472 
the tangible referents that are typically examined in social referencing paradigms (Reschke, et al., 2020). 473 
Meanwhile, in another paper (Clément & Dukes, 2017), some of us have already pointed out that 474 
although natural pedagogy is almost always described in non-affective terms, emotion and emotion 475 
expressions seem to have a very important role, particularly in ostensive signaling (Csibra, 2010). Both 476 
natural pedagogy and social referencing constitute building blocks of the ASL framework, which we 477 
present in the following section along an axis of intentionality, from both learners’ and knowers’ sides. 478 
 479 
The transmission of value through the ASL framework           480 
  481 
Social information gathering is at the core of the cultural transmission of knowledge (Baldwin & Moses, 482 
1996; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Tomasello, 1999). When one thinks of social learning, it is difficult not 483 
to think of a “classical” setting where an attentive adult is leaning toward a child, doing their best to 484 
assure a specific piece of cultural information is transmitted to the new generation. This idealized image 485 
is however misleading. First, such scaffolded transmission seems to be rare, or maybe even non-486 
existent, in non-human primates. Nevertheless, cultural transmission is a phenomenon which is not 487 
unique to our species (Hobaiter, et al., 2014; Whiten, et al., 1999). Therefore, this form of careful 488 
pedagogy cannot be the only form of cultural transmission. Moreover, anthropologists have highlighted 489 
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the fact that such explicit and organized intersubjective transmission is in fact quite rare in traditional 490 
societies, where children take the responsibility for learning, notably by observing the adults (Paradise 491 
& Rogoff, 2009; Rogoff, 2003). As highlighted above, once the primacy of this image embedded in the 492 
Western imagination is abandoned, the perception of social learning can become radically different. 493 
Cultural transmission is no more systematically dependent on an intersubjective relationship involving 494 
structured and intentional verbal exchanges: it is possible to learn simply by occupying the position of 495 
an external witness, observing the behaviors of more experienced members of one’s society (see also 496 
Kline, 2014). Moreover, an ostensive system of communication, where each member of the interaction 497 
must make the others understand that they are willing to engage with them communicatively, is not 498 
necessary for this process to occur (Gruber & Sievers, 2019). The onlooker can, for instance, notice that 499 
certain actions they observe trigger different sorts of results: some are welcomed with joy or interest, 500 
others with sadness or anger. These emotional reactions become, therefore, essential to evaluate the 501 
different behaviors that are perceptible to her. These affects indicate that an action is appropriate to get 502 
a certain result, whether technical (making the right move with a tool) or social (greeting a person in an 503 
appropriate way). In other words, social learning does not require for the subjects (a) to be necessarily 504 
involved in an intersubjective relationship – it can result from third-party observation, (b) to master an 505 
explicit language – it can be embedded in the interpretation of emotions. 506 
 507 
To detail the different possibilities offered by this fresh perspective on social learning, some of us 508 
recently proposed to call this affective social learning or ASL (Clément & Dukes, 2017). The original 509 
idea was to organize the different forms of social learning along a hierarchical line, both in term of 510 
cognitive complexity and interactional intensity (Figure 1). The most basic form of ASL is “accidental”: 511 
emotional contagion. The individuals that play the role of cultural models are not aware that their 512 
behavior may have an impact on a learner, nor is the learner aware that they are learning anything: the 513 
model simply reacts to an event in an emotional way, as the learner ‘catches’ the felt emotion, and will 514 
henceforth associate the ongoing script or situation to a given affect. Imagine, for instance, a very 515 
conservative family where every mention of their homeland, and each manifestation of their country’s 516 
grandeur, triggers a respectful silence and a sense of pride. In such a cultural environment, it is likely 517 
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that the usual triggers of such affects (the first notes of the national anthem, the raising of the flag, etc.) 518 
will trigger a similar emotion. In such circumstances, the new members of a group will ‘learn’ to value 519 
certain objects, events or persons in a way that is considered as culturally appropriate. This basic form 520 
of social transmission does not involve either intentional communication by the model, nor an 521 
interrogative attitude by the learner, who is taken by the emotionally charged context.  522 
 523 
Figure 1 524 
The ASL scale according to three dimensions of intentionality, trust and social interaction 525 
 526 
Note. Adapted from Dukes, D., & Clément, F. (Eds.). (2019). Foundations of Affective Social Learning: 527 
Conceptualizing the Social Transmission of Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page 11. 528 
Reprinted with permission from Cambridge University Press. 529 
 530 
The second form of ASL requires the learner to intend to make sense of something that she is observing, 531 
hence the name, affective observation. Typical cases are situations where the curious agent is trying to 532 
actively figure out how to behave given that the meaning of the context is still obscure for her. She will 533 
therefore explore her environment in search of a model whose reaction will inform her about the 534 
appropriate way to react in this context. Imagine that someone is invited to a party in a country where 535 
she has just arrived and where everything looks very exotic to her. Once arrived, she will rapidly scan 536 
the other guests to see how they are behaving, and observe the reactions displayed by the hosts before 537 
THE ABC OF SOCIAL LEARNING 
  21
she decides on a way to greet them: how broad should the smile be, how low should the respectful bow 538 
go? In this case too, the models do not have to intentionally communicate some culturally relevant 539 
information; the information is out there, at the disposal of any observer. Alternatively, such observation 540 
of the affective signals of a model may lead to the communication and integration of implicit biases, 541 
even if the model is unaware of those biases (Halberstadt, Hagan, & Lozada, in press). Note that in none 542 
of these cases, did the learner have to master the local language to either figure out what she was 543 
supposed to do, or what she was (not) supposed to learn.  544 
 545 
The next step in ASL requires explicit emotional communication. This time, the subject is ostensibly 546 
referring to the model for help, not knowing how to behave when confronted by an ambiguously 547 
valenced object (e.g. one that may or not be dangerous), hence the name: social referencing. This 548 
phenomenon has been discussed above: a visual cliff experiment stages a clear situation of 549 
intersubjectivity, where the two participants are intentionally engaged in a communicative exchange. 550 
Infants are requesting information and adults are intentionally providing effective cues to shape their 551 
child’s behavior. The child behaves (and perhaps, thinks) in reaction to their parent’s affective signal: 552 
a positive expression signaling “Safe. You can cross”, while a negative expression signals “Danger. Do 553 
not cross”. However, this interaction does not necessitate full-blown informative meaningful signals 554 
used in communicative interaction (e.g. expressed through verbal language): both the request 555 
(interrogative gaze) and the response (emotional expression) can be wordless. 556 
 557 
While affective observation and social referencing originally stem from a division of the concept of 558 
social appraisal introduced by Manstead and Fischer (2001), the last type of ASL, natural pedagogy (as 559 
described earlier), will be more familiar to scholars of social learning. It requires more cognitive abilities 560 
from the model because the latter undertakes to transmit complex abilities or knowledge in a structured 561 
way, checking as things progress that the learner is incorporating the information; this process is 562 
classically called pedagogy. Even if this transmission does not necessarily require linguistic exchanges 563 
(it could involve gestures, for instance), the models must possess some metarepresentational abilities. 564 
They should notably represent the present informational state of the learners and imagine a strategy to 565 
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help them acquiring the new pieces of knowledge. By observing the learners’ progress, they should 566 
evaluate their understanding and regulate the rhythm of teaching in accordance. As in all these examples 567 
of ASL, the affective bond between the social partners (labelled as ‘trust’ in Figure 1), promotes the 568 
successful transfer of the information. Here, in (natural) pedagogy, we can imagine a longer, more 569 
emotionally engaged discussion about the value of a particular toothbrush, team or tenet. We are 570 
therefore dealing here with a complex intersubjective interaction, with both parties deeply immersed in 571 
an intentional activity that is certainly cognitive, but also highly affective. Each stage of learning is 572 
welcomed with a positive reaction by the model and, when progress is made, a feeling of satisfaction is 573 
also experienced by the learner.  574 
 575 
While natural pedagogy has been markedly absent in all species other than humans, all three of the 576 
previous steps are likely to appear, to various degrees, in a number of species, offering a valid 577 
evolutionary pathway to explore both humans and other animal social learning (Gruber & Sievers, 578 
2019). An interesting comparative aspect additionally lies in the fact that while animals are often 579 
described as having very little control over the display of their emotions (but see Gruber & Grandjean, 580 
2017; Tomasello, 2008), it is in fact quite rare for a human observer to notice emotional changes in 581 
animals with the exception of strongly marked emotional reactions (e.g. fear or aggression). Yet, as 582 
Schuppli and van Schaik (2019) note: “in the absence of any discretely displayed emotion, the emotional 583 
engagement of the role model may be on a much more subtle level. Some degree of joy or happiness 584 
may result from having found a food source, even if it is an ordinary one. Building a nest might be 585 
connected to the anticipation of getting to lie down and rest soon. Complex foraging tasks (e.g. tool 586 
use) may come along with a certain excitement about getting to eat a particularly tasty or satiating food 587 
item. These emotions (or temporary affective states) of the role model may be enough to elicit an 588 
emotional engagement in the learning…” (p.34, the original authors’ emphasis). Note also that some of 589 
the described examples can alternatively also be described as possible motivations to act (Frijda, 2010). 590 
Overall, the ASL framework allows exploration of an additional dimension of learning, and to 591 
operationalize the inclusion of emotion in the social learning debate. 592 
 593 
THE ABC OF SOCIAL LEARNING 
  23
ASL and emotional feedback within the existing literature 594 
  595 
We see both similarities and differences between the ASL framework (and the emotional feedback it 596 
predicts and allows) and other models in the literature, both on a small and a large scale. The most 597 
similar large scale model was proposed by de Waal: the Bonding and Identification-based Observational 598 
Learning (BIOL) model (de Waal, 2001; de Waal & Bonnie, 2009) with BIOL defined as “a form of 599 
learning born out of the desire to belong and fit in” (de Waal & Bonnie, 2009, p22). We see many 600 
convergences with this model, particularly its departure from the classic view (e.g. Bandura, 1977) that 601 
social learning only occurs when there are extrinsic rewards either for the model or for the observer, a 602 
focus on rewards still very present in the animal learning literature today. The BIOL model predicts that 603 
social learning will be guided by social relations, and several instances of supporting evidence have 604 
appeared in the context of cultural and communication acquisition in animals (Fröhlich, Müller, Zeiträg, 605 
Wittig, & Pika, 2017; Lamon, et al., 2017; Mann, Stanton, Patterson, Bienenstock, & Singh, 2012). 606 
However, there are important differences between BIOL and ASL, the most important of which is that 607 
BIOL focuses on the social relationship between two conspecifics and what underpins that relationship 608 
– the bonding and identification - rather than the consequences of that relationship. In contrast, while 609 
ASL does indeed highlight the importance of that relationship, especially in the later steps, it focuses 610 
more on how much the successful transmission of value(s) is a result of the established relationship, 611 
whatever it is (e.g. one would still learn something from an unrelated man screaming while running 612 
away from a subway entrance).   613 
 614 
In terms of similar smaller scale theoretical frameworks and models similar to ASL, one concerns the 615 
learning of fear, and has the advantage of offering numerous cross-species comparisons. Previous work 616 
carried out by Olsson and Phelps (Olsson & Phelps, 2007) points out that it is particularly important to 617 
try and learn from others’ relations to objects in the environment when the objects can be risky, for 618 
example, by recognizing other people’s fear (see also Part 1). In one experiment, Olsson and Phelps 619 
(2004) compared the use of Pavlovian conditioning, observational learning and vocal ‘instruction’ in 620 
the learning of a painful experience (electric shocks). All three groups learned to associate the stimuli 621 
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(angry faces) with the shocks in an unmasked condition (i.e. when the stimulus was clearly perceptible 622 
to the participants); however, only participants in the Pavlovian and observational conditions still 623 
reacted physiologically to the conditioned stimuli when they were masked. Hence, being told that a 624 
particular neutral stimulus is dangerous only worked at a conscious level, while experiencing the 625 
consequences oneself or observing someone else suffer the consequences, was enough for the reaction 626 
to become automatic. There is substantial cross-species support for the idea that fear can be learned 627 
from others, particularly when the stimulus is naturally aversive. In one such study, mice that observed 628 
biting flies attacking other mice reacted just as strongly as the models to the flies 24 hours later, despite 629 
being exposed to harmless flies (Kavaliers, Choleris, & Colwell, 2001). 630 
 631 
According to Olsson and Phelps (2007), social learning “lies at the core of the forces that create and 632 
maintain culture, which might then affect biological evolution”, with “social fear learning offering the 633 
opportunity to study the transmission of biologically relevant information between individuals” (p. 634 
1100). This echoes our description of ASL as a conduit for the social transmission of social value, and 635 
a means by which culture can be transmitted and perpetuated (Clément & Dukes, 2017). Phelps and 636 
Olsson limit their claims to the learning of fear and threat within a Pavlovian reward-based model 637 
(Debiec & Olsson, 2017; Olsson, Knapska, & Lindström, 2020; Olsson, Nearing, & Phelps, 2007; 638 
Olsson & Phelps, 2004), citing evidence related to naturally aversive stimuli. In line with this, a recent 639 
study of the social learning of fear in fear-relevant (naturally aversive) and fear-irrelevant stimuli, 640 
corroborating earlier findings (Hygge & Öhman, 1978), revealed stronger acquisition effects for fear-641 
relevant (snake and spider), verbally conditioned stimuli compared to fear-irrelevant (bird and 642 
butterfly), verbally conditioned stimuli (Mertens, Raes, & De Houwer, 2016). Yet, we argue that 643 
affective evaluations can be learned about objects that have no naturally occurring aversive quality. A 644 
particular haircut, a certain style of dance, or a specific idea can become a source of ridicule or respect, 645 
depending on how those around us evaluate them. Objects that may have left an observer entirely 646 
indifferent can also acquire value through exposure to the affective reaction of others, whose social 647 
appraisal works best in ambiguous situations (Bruder, Fischer, & Manstead, 2014).  648 
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Overall, the ASL framework fits well with other large or smaller scale models that have strived to 649 
include an affective dimension to learning. However, we believe that by highlighting the role of affect 650 
in the social learning process, ASL contributes to integrating affect into models of social learning.     651 
 652 
Defining ‘values’: from ‘relevant behavior’ to complex ‘social values’  653 
  654 
ASL was originally defined as the social learning of values (Clément & Dukes, 2017). For this concept 655 
to be relevant across sciences, one needs to define clearly what the term ‘values’ encompasses. On the 656 
one hand, the term ‘values’, at its core, can be understood through general emotion theories, 657 
encompassing for example dimensional models of emotions (Sander, 2013). In particular, common 658 
valence-based distinctions are found between “positive” and “negative” emotions, evidenced by 659 
Tomkins’ (1963) influential division between positive and negative affects. Such distinctions are found 660 
in most models of emotions. Hence, for affective scientists, the notion of social value may find a place 661 
at the core of affective theory. However, values can also be discussed as the patriotic feeling towards 662 
the flag we discussed above. This is an equally valid interpretation of the term, yet it also raises several 663 
questions. While this value can be acquired through seemingly simple cognitive processes that do not 664 
require ostension or directed teaching, it is unlikely to be found in non-human animals, nor in ancient 665 
hominin societies, including our direct ancestors, that did not possess such notions as patriotism. In 666 
contrast, the positive/negative dichotomy may be present across species, itself requiring little conceptual 667 
understanding, while still allowing the evolutionary possibility of metacognitive thinking about such 668 
values. For example, Panksepp discusses a definition of affective consciousness as “brain states that 669 
have an experiential feel to them” (J. Panksepp, 2005, p.32), and argues that reflective sensory-670 
perceptual feelings and emotional-motivational experiences, completed by secondary-consciousness 671 
(which refers to the capacity to have thoughts about external events), are present to some extent in other 672 
animals. Yet, he excludes a third layer of metacognitive reflection upon those brain states, which would 673 
be limited to humans. We believe that such a distinction and this three-step consciousness scale of affect 674 
is of particular interest from both a comparative and developmental perspective.  675 
 676 
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From a developmental perspective, the transmission of these ‘lean’ values appears more 677 
straightforward, with numerous examples documented over the last 40 years (Sorce, et al., 1985). A 678 
relevant question here is at which point such reasoning becomes self-conscious in the child’s mind, 679 
reaching the third metacognitive level hinted at by Panksepp. In other words, many seemingly complex 680 
cognitive processes in developing infants and children may be more simply explained by ‘lower level’ 681 
ASL steps that do not require explicit complex processes such as ostensive behavior or complex 682 
metacognitive reasoning abilities. To illustrate this, one can look at the relationship that young infants 683 
establish with artifacts across development. The latter is first described with 2-year-olds reaching an 684 
understanding of some properties of artifacts but without forming an overall concept of tools (Mandler, 685 
2007), followed by 3-year-olds understanding that tools are ‘made for’ a given purpose and selecting 686 
them accordingly (DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008). When close to six years of age, children start 687 
understanding that a tool has been intentionally manufactured by a designer to fulfil some function 688 
(Kelemen & Carey, 2007). This also represents an important cognitive and representational shift from 689 
age five, when the function of an artifact is not completely clear in the child’s mind, fulfilling any goal 690 
a user might have, to age seven, when the function has become that of the artifact’s typical or intended 691 
use (Defeyter & German, 2003). In other words, according to this cognitive framework, it is only by 692 
age five that ostension or metarepresentative abilities are needed to fully acquire the concept of tools. 693 
Yet, the preparatory work before that age may be accomplished through the assistance of ASL processes 694 
that allow particular objects to acquire value as tools in the child’s mind. On the other hand, whether 695 
tool-using animals are ever to grant a value to a particular tool remains to be investigated, with the 696 
possibility of some objects acquiring a relevance in some animal groups, which disappears in those that 697 
do not make use of these tools, seeding cultural differences (Gruber, Muller, Reynolds, Wrangham, & 698 
Zuberbühler, 2011). 699 
 700 
Section summary  701 
  702 
In this section, overall, we have shown that the affective literature includes many notions also found in 703 
the classical social learning literature and can be integrated into a general discussion of social learning. 704 
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In particular, we have proposed that the ASL framework allows investigation of such dimensions, and 705 
is crucially organized according to the same intentionality scale found in the developmental and 706 
behavioral literature (Clément & Dukes, 2017; Dukes & Clément, 2017). We also argued that the ASL 707 
framework is particularly suited to study cultural transmission across species and developmental stages 708 
by allowing the existence of mechanisms which vary in their cognitive demand. In the following section, 709 
we aim to expand this approach to highlight the fact that no current model of social learning can in fact 710 
make complete abstraction of emotion, and that in reality, they are, possibly unconsciously, already 711 
including them in their models as notions in developmental cognitive research.  712 
 713 
Part 3: Integrating the three approaches of social learning 714 
 715 
In this section, we evaluate how the different approaches to social learning (behavioral, cognitive and 716 
affective) overlap in their object of study, and argue that separate domains of study should strive to 717 
adopt a common language where an affective layer is acknowledged. We illustrate our point with two 718 
examples taken from the literature. First, we argue that what developmental psychologists often study 719 
as ‘curiosity’ can also be investigated under the affective notion (or emotion) of ‘interest’, and that this 720 
notion can also be found in animals, particularly when formalized under the notion of ‘peering 721 
behavior’. Second, we argue that social referencing, in itself, offers ways to navigate between 722 
emotionally and cognitively-loaded approaches. Finally, we begin to introduce how neuroscience can 723 
contribute to integrating these three approaches of social learning, employing the research in empathy 724 
as an example, as it too strives to integrate cognitive and affective aspects, thus providing a blueprint 725 
for investigating the neural correlates of affective, behavioral and cognitive social learning. 726 
 727 
Emotional interest and epistemic curiosity 728 
 729 
As we argue for an integration of the three lines of research on social learning, the distinction between 730 
what is affective, behavioral and cognitive often blurs. One such blurring distinction is that between a 731 
(non-affective) epistemic curiosity and the emotion of interest. Confusingly perhaps, the term epistemic 732 
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emotion actually often includes phenomena that would not normally be included as emotions (Arango-733 
Muñoz & Michaelian, 2014; Meylan, 2014). While it is certainly possible to make a case to maintain 734 
these two phenomena as distinct (Hidi & Renninger, 2020), we argue that there is much reason to 735 
analyze them together. Indeed, they have even been used synonymously by some researchers (Silvia & 736 
Kashdan, 2009). Crucially, they provide an example of a cross-specific and cross-developmental 737 
application of our theoretical position. 738 
 739 
Curiosity is broadly defined as active information seeking motivated by internal rather than external 740 
rewards, and the term captures a range of behaviors, including those that pertain to infants, from targeted 741 
search for a particular bit of information to broad sampling of the environmental affordances, and from 742 
tactile stimulation seeking to the pursuit of knowledge. Curiosity is most often analyzed from a 743 
cognitive perspective and as a cognitive phenomenon (Bazhydai, Twomey, & Westermann, 2020; 744 
Berlyne, 1960; Gottlieb & Oudeyer, 2018), often taking place in social contexts, manifesting in infants’ 745 
active social learning through interaction with suitable (familiar, friendly, or knowledgeable) social 746 
partners, and ultimately helping fulfil infants’ information seeking goals and maximizing their 747 
epistemic benefit. A different take on curiosity (as here defined, ‘a desire’) is to approach it as an 748 
emotion: interest. Such a reading does not change fundamentally the way one approaches curiosity. As 749 
part of an inherent interplay between autonomous and social processes, it is a catalyst of social learning 750 
and epistemic development, broadly speaking. Yet, this also underlines the blurry lines between 751 
cognitive and emotional approaches at a developmental stage, where it is difficult and perhaps inutile 752 
to try and parse what is cognitive and what is emotional.  753 
 754 
An important comparative aspect here lies in the existence of a similar mechanisms in non-humans 755 
during learning acquisition: peering behavior, that is the attentive close-range watching of the activities 756 
of an (often older) conspecific (Schuppli, et al., 2016; Schuppli & van Schaik, 2019). This offers ways 757 
of discussing behavioral continuity in knowledge transmission, particularly with our closest relatives, 758 
the great apes. Orangutans, in particular, acquire much of their knowledge through peering behavior; 759 
summarizing a large body of work in one location in Sumatra famous for its tool-using orangutans, 760 
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Suaq Balimbing, Schuppli and van Schaik (2019) show that peering behavior could be involved in the 761 
acquisition of 191 different skills and knowledge elements spanning knowledge of food species to 762 
consume, moving habits, social behavior as well as tool use. Favored models for infants were adults, 763 
with often very little information taken from juveniles and other infants; yet, interestingly, during late 764 
juvenility (corresponding to the human adolescence), the most frequent peering targets turned out to be 765 
other juveniles, mirroring other findings in the development of chimpanzee vocal behavior (Laporte & 766 
Zuberbühler, 2011). Overall, these findings show that there is much ground for comparison between 767 
human and nonhuman curiosity and interest. 768 
 769 
Social referencing: how affective is it?  770 
 771 
A second example of the blurred distinction is that of social referencing as an essentially emotional or 772 
cognitive mechanism. Several theories requiring different levels of cognitive complexity have been 773 
proposed to explain the development of social referencing behavior. To adjudicate between low-level, 774 
associative, and higher-level, cognitively rich explanations, a developmental perspective can be 775 
adopted. According to such an approach, social referencing in the first year of life may constitute 776 
information seeking with rudimentary understanding of intentional communication, which is 777 
nevertheless sufficient to solicit timely and reliable transfer of knowledge from social partners. An 778 
important point of discussion has been whether social referencing in uncertain situations constitutes 779 
information seeking or attachment motivated behavior (Stenberg & Hagekull, 2007; Striano, Vaish, & 780 
Benigno, 2006). Overall, studies provide support for the expertise rather than attachment (or comfort 781 
seeking) account of social referencing, proposing that infants are sensitive to the social distribution of 782 
knowledge (Feinman, Roberts, Hsieh, Sawyer, & Swanson, 1992; Stenberg, 2013). In particular, when 783 
a situational expert is an unfamiliar experimenter, infants are more likely to refer to them rather than 784 
their primary caregiver or another less knowledgeable adult, who in this context is as uncertain about 785 
the situation as the infant herself (Stenberg, 2013).  786 
 787 
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Whether or not preverbal infants have a full grasp of intentionality of their communicative acts, they do 788 
learn a great amount of new and useful information through initiating a social gaze, which may be a 789 
genesis of social information exchange. Some studies suggest that social referencing serves a 790 
cognitively rich function of information seeking, going beyond the emotional ‘go/no-go’ checking in 791 
as potential proto-interrogative, requestive acts, which develop before interrogative pointing (Begus & 792 
Southgate, 2018; Harris & Lane, 2014). For example, experimental reports focus on situations of 793 
cognitive-perceptual ambiguity rather than unpleasantness or perceived danger – situations of epistemic 794 
uncertainty featuring a lower threshold of uncertainty than the typical highly emotionally arousing 795 
paradigms. Reports show that infants refer to their social partners when their expectations are violated 796 
(Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Koenig & Echols, 2003), upon detecting humorous situations (Mireault et al., 797 
2014), when facing uncertainty about object-label relationships (Bazhydai, Westermann, et al., 2020; 798 
Hembacher, deMayo, & Frank, 2020), or needing information about hidden object location (Goupil, 799 
Romand-Monnier, & Kouider, 2016). These studies challenge the long-standing view that social 800 
referencing seeks others’ socio-emotional engagement and is not fully intentionally communicative 801 
until the second year of infant’s life (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Schaffer, 1984). Instead, they suggest 802 
that social referencing is an active communicative behavior allowing preverbal infants to resolve not 803 
only affective, but also epistemic uncertainty in social learning contexts. 804 
 805 
In sum, well established accounts of social referencing propose that children refer to social partners to 806 
gather their reactions to uncertainty, which is affective in nature, and to determine how to appropriately 807 
react to it. However, with development, the same behavior can become less emotionally laden, 808 
transforming into strategic information seeking rather than social appraisal seeking. Bridging the 809 
cognitive and affective social learning aspects, we argue that social referencing lies at the heart of 810 
children’s social acquisition of knowledge, epitomizing the parallel between the affective and cognitive 811 
dimensions. Among examples of these two sides, are infants’ social referencing towards their caregivers 812 
upon encountering not only an unexpected emotional but also a cognitive challenge (as described 813 
above). 814 
 815 
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How much of this is present in non-humans is worth investigating. Non-humans are sensitive to both 816 
conspecifics’ and non-conspecifics’ emotional cues. For example, vervets (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) 817 
are sensitive to meaningful alarm vocalizations that are mostly regarded as emotional (Price et al., 818 
2015). These cues might even be emitted to aid learning (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1986). Elsewhere, some 819 
of us have argued that social referencing is particularly promising to study the acquisition of animal 820 
cultures and signals (Gruber & Sievers, 2019) as it represents a good compromise, by being less 821 
cognitively demanding than traditional learning processes, yet well suited to the emotional dimension 822 
inherent to animal learning (LeDoux, 2012; J. Panksepp, 2011a). For instance, the way members of a 823 
stick-less chimpanzee community proceed with intentionally removing sticks from the hands of their 824 
offspring may qualify as an example of social referencing (or even pedagogy), leading ultimately to the 825 
failure of these chimpanzees to represent sticks as tools (Gruber & Sievers, 2019). 826 
 827 
Neural substrates of cognitive and emotional processes overlap 828 
 829 
Discussion concerning the similarities and differences between what is cognitive and what is affective 830 
can be found in several of the disciplines that contribute to the affective sciences. For example, 831 
‘affective neuroscience’, a term first coined in the 1990s (J. Panksepp, 1998), has from its very inception 832 
addressed questions concerning how to characterize cognitive and affective processes and to identify 833 
areas and networks of the brain that could be said to be wholly one or the other, or indeed both. While 834 
such discussions continue, one area of research that can perhaps serve to illustrate such debate and 835 
suggest how to ground the current approach on a more neuroscientific footing is the research on 836 
empathy. The cognitive and affective aspects of empathy, and their overlap, have indeed been the focus 837 
of much interest. Often defined from a mentalistic perspective as putting oneself in someone else’s 838 
shoes (Baron-Cohen, 2005), the cognitive approach, fully at work during the teaching process displayed 839 
by humans, can be contrasted with a more emotional approach to empathy, a useful notion particularly 840 
for animals and young infants (de Waal & Preston, 2017). Emotional empathy includes mechanisms 841 
such as emotional contagion, which we have already highlighted as a main component of ASL, 842 
suggesting perhaps that empathy should also be taken into more consideration in future studies of ASL. 843 
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For example, in a more complex form of empathy known as targeted helping (de Waal & Preston, 844 
2017), a chimpanzee finds the specific tool that another needs in an experimental context (Yamamoto, 845 
Humle, & Tanaka, 2012), a result directly relevant to the investigation of teaching behavior in the wild 846 
(Musgrave, et al., 2020). Research on the neural correlates of empathy, which has flourished over the 847 
last two decades, may allow characterizing the mechanisms at work during the different components of 848 
this complex phenomenon as cognitive, affective, or both (de Waal & Preston, 2017).  849 
 850 
In particular, neuroscience has allowed the identification of regions that are more concerned with 851 
affective empathy than with cognitive empathy (de Waal & Preston, 2017), but also regions that are 852 
involved in both processes such as the anterior middle cingulate cortex (aMCC), located at the extremity 853 
of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Alongside structures such as the amygdala (often involved in 854 
fear learning, but generally present in most emotionally-salient processes) or the insula (found 855 
particularly in connection to disgust), the ACC is known for its involvement in affective processes, 856 
particularly as an integration hub between the affective limbic system and the more cognitive prefrontal 857 
cortex (Sander, 2013; Stevens et al., 2011). Another region of overlap between cognition and affect, 858 
and itself also an integration hub, is the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), involved in cognitive sequential 859 
structures, language and emotion evaluation (Greenfield, 1991; Gruber & Grandjean, 2017; Koechlin 860 
& Jubault, 2006). Interestingly, the IFG is also part of the human mirror neuron system, which has been 861 
connected to a large range of human socio-cognitive abilities, including empathy (but see Hickok, 2014; 862 
Iacoboni, 2009). While we will not engage here in the debate on the role of the mirror neuron system 863 
in these abilities, their potential involvement in chimpanzee imitative behavior during tool use 864 
acquisition (Fuhrmann, Ravignani, Marshall-Pescini, & Whiten, 2014) provides another bridge between 865 
empathy and social learning research; with the former providing a blueprint to investigate the affective 866 
and cognitive aspects of social learning concurrently through neuroimaging, in a comparative (e.g. 867 
Debracque, Gruber, Lacoste, Grandjean, & Meguerditchian, 2021) and developmental perspective. 868 
 869 
Section summary   870 
 871 
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In this section, we have seen that major objects of research overlap across the three approaches, 872 
sometimes being referred to by different names (cognitive curiosity versus emotional interest) or by the 873 
same one (social referencing). We have argued that associating both a cognitive and affective dimension 874 
appears the most promising approach, explaining the behavior inherent to social learning, and 875 
illustrating that such a position is shared in the study of complex phenomena such as empathy. Besides 876 
the obvious connections of the latter with ASL, we believe that the neuroscientific research on empathy 877 
offers a way forward to integrate the affective and cognitive dimensions of social learning. We have 878 
also argued that adopting a stance combining cognitive and affective dimensions allows evaluation of 879 
the predominantly behavioral animal literature within the same theoretical framework and hence 880 
promote continuity between humans and other animals. In the final section, we present our 881 
implementation of an ABC approach to social learning. To do so, we propose a radical extension of the 882 
ASL framework as a tentative move to fully integrate the three traditions into one complete story. 883 
 884 
Part 4: The ABC of social learning 885 
 886 
ASL as an extended backbone to models of social learning  887 
 888 
ASL in its four-step form may not be exhaustive in covering all possible cases of learning involving 889 
affective input by a knower. For a case of social referencing, the learner seeks out information from the 890 
knower by focusing on the knower’s expressive behavior by intentionally establishing eye-contact. 891 
According to the ASL framework, the knower provides information intentionally through displaying a 892 
befitting affective state. While at this stage limited active exchange of meaningful, informative signals 893 
is necessary, this is a mandatory requirement for natural pedagogy. In turn, for a case to count as natural 894 
pedagogy, ostensive communication of meaningful signals (e.g. words or gestures) is necessary (Gruber 895 
& Sievers, 2019). Given how ostensive communication is often described as cognitively challenging, 896 
requiring layers of meta-representations and a full-blown theory of mind, only (some) human 897 
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interactions fall under these stringent requirements, and any kind of simpler communicative display by 898 
knowers would not meet the criteria. This concerns, for example, cases that involve an active exchange 899 
of signals between learner and knower, e.g. with the knower producing behavior or signals in 900 
accordance to their goals towards the learner, but without being interested in accessing the mind of the 901 
latter. These cases are not described in the ASL framework, as they go beyond what is generally labelled 902 
social referencing, but are not yet to be counted as natural pedagogy. Cases like this may involve active 903 
teaching to a certain degree. Most examples of animal teaching rely on so-called innate processes that 904 
appear far from the intentional transmission found in humans (see above). Yet, an emotion-based social 905 
learning framework may explain the recent claims of chimpanzee teaching made by Musgrave, et al. 906 
(2020) without having to argue for additional associated cognitive complexities of intention-based 907 
teaching. The directional scaffolding the authors describe could indeed form the basis of a cultural 908 
transmission of a relevant behavior for chimpanzees amongst a complex dataset. 909 
 910 
Another possible scenario involves learners actively producing meaningful signals, either ostensively 911 
or not, and knowers simply responding behaviorally, showing affective states, but not engaging in 912 
communication (think for example of a curious child observing a lion escaping its cage at the zoo and 913 
actively seeking to exchange information about this novel setting with her parents while seeing them 914 
suddenly screaming in fear). Real cases of interactions that facilitate learning may also in general not 915 
be as clear-cut as required by experimental paradigms. For instance, when chimpanzees cross a road, 916 
the interaction between knowledgeable individuals crossing first, waiting for, and interacting more or 917 
less actively with young individuals who are scared of crossing the road (see Table 1), could entail very 918 
different levels of active influencing by the knower and active requesting of information by the learner, 919 
leading cases to be classified as social referencing or the possibility of extending beyond the borders of 920 
the former. 921 
 922 
All the illustrated examples above in comparative and developmental psychology suggest that the 923 
various existing steps of the ASL framework are part of a continuum. Yet, this limitation of considering 924 
ASL as a four-step framework would be rather structural, and was highlighted here in this way to offer 925 
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a common language between well-defined concepts in both affective science and developmental science 926 
incorporated into a hierarchy of processes that involve affective states as elements that facilitate 927 
learning, topped by the most distinctively human and cognitively complex form of active teaching. At 928 
the theoretical level, the scope of the ASL framework is indeed about describing a knower’s emotional 929 
states impact on the process of social learning in a learner, and in particular, ASL is about learning how 930 
to feel about something, how to value it. One way to deal with this issue of precisely attributing a case 931 
to a given category would be to introduce further steps into the framework. While it may be impossible 932 
to distinguish steps to cover all possible cases, they will all be situated along a continuum involving 933 
more or less active communication and affective input on both the knower’s and learner’s sides. We 934 
thus argue that ASL can constitute a backbone to an affective model of social learning across species 935 
(Figure 2), irrespective of whether a particular step must be identified, as long as the particular cognitive 936 
requisites (e.g. ostension, representational level, degree of interaction between learner and knower, see 937 
Gruber & Sievers, 2019) can be described. Overall, our approach aims to illustrate that whether 938 
individuals seek to exchange information that is itself either affective or not (e.g. seeking an object’s 939 
label rather than seeking positive emotional feedback), all learning is influenced by emotional cues, if 940 
not completely embedded in emotional interpersonal communication.  941 
 942 
As the clean lines of what is affective, behavioral and cognitive blur, it is worth considering the original 943 
ASL framework again. In Part 1 of this paper, we described the animal behavioral and human cognitive 944 
traditions of social learning in terms of increasing intentionality, as the cognitive mechanisms involved 945 
become more complex. In Part 2 and 3, we described how there was an affective base underpinning all 946 
of these mechanisms whether explicitly in ASL, or implicitly in the other traditions. In the ASL 947 
framework, this affective component is held to be equally important across all of the mechanisms, and 948 
the same is true here. And finally, with a view to integrating these models, it can be observed that there 949 
is increasing social interaction, or behavior, on a third axis (Figure 2). As argued above, the ASL 950 
framework can constitute the structure of an ABC approach that integrates all three strands of the social 951 
learning story. 952 
 953 
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 954 
Figure 2  955 
ASL as a backbone to an integrated approach of affect, behavior and cognition to social learning. 956 
 957 
Note. As in Figure 1, the direction of the arrows for cognition and behavior indicates that they can only 958 
grow in terms of content and complexity. However, the bidirectional arrow for affect suggests that the 959 
affective dimension is more or less developed depending on the species considered as a whole. Adapted 960 
from Dukes, D., & Clément, F. (Eds.). (2019). Foundations of Affective Social Learning: 961 
Conceptualizing the Social Transmission of Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page 11. 962 
Reprinted with permission from Cambridge University Press. 963 
 964 
Using affect as an evolutionary and developmental bridge  965 
 966 
One may raise the paradox of including emotional contagion in an account of learning about objects. 967 
Social learning is characterized by there being three relational corners – the learner, the knower and the 968 
object – even if, unlike in social appraisal, there is no explicit object in emotional contagion strictly 969 
speaking (Parkinson, 2011). While we motivated emotional contagion’s inclusion earlier from a 970 
theoretical point of view, emotional contagion proper may nevertheless not find its place in an account 971 
of social learning other than as an endpoint, a boundary condition with any slight increase of 972 
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intentionality leading to social learning, or a zone delimiting what is non-object centered emotional 973 
contagion and what is object centered affective observation. Yet, emotion contagion has often been 974 
used as a baseline explanatory process in animals (e.g. Wheeler & Fischer, 2012), underlying the interest 975 
in keeping this notion in the ASL framework, bringing continuity between humans and other animals 976 
from a comparative and evolutionary perspective. In effect, the use of this ‘low-cognition process’ as 977 
an explanatory factor contrasts very much with the evolutionary explanations traditionally offered to 978 
explain the occurrence of features such as language conventions and learning of opaque knowledge, 979 
which are said to rely on complex cognitive capacities such as meta-representation, mindreading, or 980 
perspective taking (Townsend et al., 2017). All of those are high-cognition complex features (but see 981 
Southgate, 2020), which in part makes the presence of some of them in infants and young children 982 
almost impossible to explain, or their cognitively-loaded explanations highly questionable. For instance, 983 
for young children to acquire opaque knowledge, as reviewed above, it is often required that children 984 
display the ability of perspective-taking, i.e. that they take the perspective of the knower to grasp the 985 
latter’s intention, allowing them to imitate a given action (Tomasello, et al., 2005). It is additionally 986 
suggested that to do so, children must display a fully developed ToM, even though the latter may only 987 
arise around four years of age, suggesting the need for alternative explanations in younger children. The 988 
same holds true of other animals. Elsewhere, some of us have argued that some animals are likely to 989 
exhibit the cognitive abilities for at least three of the ASL steps (Gruber & Sievers, 2019), including 990 
social referencing, suggesting that any step in between can be identified as well. However, it remains 991 
unlikely that any non-human may engage in human-like natural pedagogy. 992 
 993 
Yet, by acknowledging that affective states may play a big role in acquiring knowledge, we argue that 994 
assumptions regarding cognitively loaded features (e.g. metarepresentation) can be downgraded, being 995 
in fine applicable for both non-humans and very young children. For example, learning from complex 996 
behavior only requires learners to attend to certain aspects of the behavior displayed by the knower to 997 
infer the knower’s intention linked to the behavior. Capacities such as perspective taking (but also 998 
shared attention) can, however, be established through the affective states in the knower perceived by 999 
the learner. By displaying a certain affective state towards an object, for instance, or a certain way of 1000 
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doing things, the knower ascribes value to their behavior, and in turn directs the focus of the learner. 1001 
This may imply that cognitively complex processes are not necessary: for instance, full-blown ToM 1002 
may become superfluous in this instance, as learners are not required to infer concrete intentions but 1003 
merely some unspecified goals in the knower involved. Overall, relying on an affective dimension in 1004 
the model allows lowering the high cognitive thresholds proposed by a cognitive-only approach, while 1005 
not denying the particular requisites at each step, offering a solution in both the evolutionary and 1006 
developmental debates at stake. 1007 
 1008 
Connecting traditions to obtain a complete picture of social learning  1009 
 1010 
While one of our aims was to blend affect into theoretical models of cultural learning (ASL in particular 1011 
aims at explaining how individuals learn to feel about something, which has deep cultural consequences, 1012 
see below), our principal objective was also to reconcile three strands of research that seem to have 1013 
either ignored or even denigrated each other (e.g. Boesch, 2007). In our view, all three approaches are 1014 
valid and can describe and illuminate a particular side of knowledge acquisition in both humans and 1015 
non-humans (e.g. Table 1). Only by precisely describing every aspect can we obtain a complete picture 1016 
of the learning processes, as well as their comparability across species and developmental stages. Yet, 1017 
given that three different elements (affective, behavioral and cognitive output) appear involved in 1018 
parallel in the cases described so far, it may be complicated to define clear-cut steps characterized by 1019 
particular degrees of cognitive complexity or the importance of emotion in the learning processes; 1020 
hence, the involvement of each of the three elements may have to be described separately for any given 1021 
scenario. This is, of course, common practice in science, as researchers reduce a particular phenomenon 1022 
to observable and measurable parts for convenience. The ABC approach puts the three-part story of 1023 
social learning back together again, superimposing the three dimensions of Affect, Behavior and 1024 
Cognition while acknowledging their specificities. Even when similarly organized along the lines of 1025 
intentional behavior, all dimensions can thus be considered independently from each other, giving 1026 
overall more flexibility for analysis. For example, it is possible that a grown-up adult who normally 1027 
engages with a toddler using pedagogy incites the latter to engage with a new device by simply 1028 
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interacting with it (stimulus enhancement) while pretending to ignore the toddler to foster her curiosity: 1029 
in such a case, from the view of the child, there is no interaction with the model, while the model herself 1030 
displays fully developed ToM to pretend that she is not aware that her actions will modify her toddler’s 1031 
goals. Similarly, the amount of feedback received by the learner can vary from an emotional experience 1032 
(e.g. a female chimpanzee scared to approach an experimental task), to a precise technique (e.g. how to 1033 
manufacture a stick to extract honey from a log), to the instructions to follow to successfully complete 1034 
a particular task (so far limited to humans).  1035 
 1036 
In effect, it is possible to describe (emotional) contagion, (affective) observation, social referencing and 1037 
(natural) pedagogy cases in affective, behavioral, and cognitive terms (Table 1). For some, the work 1038 
appears straightforward: as described above, social referencing has been both used in emotional and 1039 
cognitive contexts in the literature, despite the fact that that one dimension is unlikely to go without the 1040 
other. And, notably, whether the focus was on the cognitive or affective context, successful referencing 1041 
was often measured in term of the presence or absence of resulting behavior. It stems from these studies 1042 
that infants are able to appreciate, deliberately seek out, and incorporate information (such as intentional 1043 
emotional expressions and knowledge about the world, broadly speaking) from trusted adults into their 1044 
decision-making process about the encountered emotionally or epistemically uncertain situation. 1045 
Perhaps this is moderated by the ability to not only appreciate the relation between the other and her 1046 
goal or the relevant object, but also the desire to understand the other by reading her emotions, and by 1047 
the motivation to seek out information from the knowledgeable other, and by the relationship between 1048 
the two people. A similar approach can be used for affective observation and natural pedagogy. In 1049 
addition, it is possible to equally describe what happens in other species, highlighting where differences 1050 
occur with human development.  1051 
 1052 
Table 1  1053 
Applying the ABC approach to social learning cases in the real world 1054 
 1055 
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Examples Affective approach Behavioral approach Cognitive approach 
A young boy learning 
to tie his shoes 
He is excited, motivated 
and interested in learning a 
new skill  
 
He is curious about how 
this is done 
 
He is frustrated when not 
succeeding at first 
 
He recognizes and 
responds to his mother’s 
praise 
 
He is overjoyed when 
succeeding, pushing him to 
restart immediately 
He observes the end point 
left by his mother (a node 
made on the other shoe)  
 
He observes the behavioral 
form produced by his mother 
to tie her own node 
 
He attends to the modeling of 
his mother 
He imagines the shape of the 
node to be made 
 
He represents the exact moves 
that need to be made to obtain 
the node as demonstrated by 
his mother 
 
He recognizes his mother’s 
intention to teach him 
 
He asks his mother for help or 




A young chimpanzee 
learning to crack nuts 
He feels that cracking nuts 
is safe as his mother does 
not demonstrate visible 
fear 
 
He recognizes his mother 
is interested in her tool-
using activity 
 
He is sufficiently interested 
(perhaps because he is 
hungry?) to attend to his 
mother’s display rather 
than play with other 
juveniles 
 
Once he succeeds, he feels 
a heightened anticipation 
toward the cracked nut, 
and then enjoyment as he 
eats it. He is motivated to 
continue  
He observes the end result (a 
cracked nut) 
 
He observes the behavioral 
form produced by a 
knowledgeable individual 
 
He produces a sequence of 
actions aiming at opening the 
nut 
He represents the end state of 
the nut (a cracked nut)  
 
He associates hammering and 
obtaining a cracked nut 
 
He notices his cracking 
behavior does not result in 
obtaining a cracked nut 
 
He attends to the tool-using 
activity of his mother 
A young girl aiming to 
cross the road where 
her sibling has already 
crossed 
She is afraid of crossing 
because a very fast car just 
passed 
 
She is anxious of being 
scolded by her siblings if 
they are late 
 
She trusts her siblings’ 
judgement that the road is 
safe to cross 
She displays behavior clues 
that she wants to join her 
siblings who have already 
crossed the road 
 
She observes her siblings on 
the other side of the road, 
who are gesturing and calling 
towards her 
She represents her siblings’ 
goal: they want her to cross the 
road 
 
She understands that they will 
be late if she does not cross. 
She does not want to make 
them wait and risk being late 
for dinner 
 
She asks her sister for 
guidance how to cross the road 
safely 
A young chimpanzee 
crossing the road when 
his group has already 
crossed 
She is afraid of crossing 
because a very fast car just 
passed 
 
She feels the tense 
situation in other 
individuals being alert 
when crossing the road 
 
She does not get upset as 
the behavior of the alpha 
male is not threatening 
She displays behavior clues 
that she wants to join the rest 
of the group on the other side 
of the road 
 
She observes the alpha male 
waiting on the other side and 
looking back towards her 
She recognizes the danger 
associated with crossing the 
road  
 
She knows she is likely to 
encounter humans (or hear 
them) while crossing the road 
 
She notices the lack of fear 
expression in the alpha male’s 
facial expression  
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 1056 
Application of the ABC approach to the evolution of culture and language 1057 
 1058 
In this final section, we illustrate how the ABC approach can shed some new light on a diversity of 1059 
phenomena spanning from cultural learning to the occurrence and proliferation of language 1060 
conventions, language and signal comprehension and acquisition. In each of these cases, affect, in 1061 
parallel to cognition, facilitates the occurrence and fixation of the feature in a given group, leading to 1062 
the appropriate behavior involved in the feature in question. To underline the use of our approach, in 1063 
what follows, we explain how an ABC approach contributes to a paradigmatic change of describing 1064 
these features and their occurrences through cognition, affect and behavior in unison.  1065 
 1066 
While definitions of social cognition have perhaps principally focused on the mental states of others 1067 
and predictions of their behavior (on others, Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016; Fiske & Taylor, 2013), 1068 
one alternative, as exemplified in our ABC approach, is to focus on the information itself (from others, 1069 
Clément, 2010; Harris, 2012). Accordingly, the study of the affective information provided to us by 1070 
others falls under the term ‘social appraisal’: whether someone tells us that a film is worth watching, or 1071 
that we have to decide whether the majority or expert minority are better sources of information, we are 1072 
taking into consideration other people’s affective views about an object. Both adults and infants as 1073 
young as 3-years-old trust more the testimony of people who look happy than those who look angry, 1074 
easing their learning (Clément, Bernard, Grandjean, & Sander, 2013). Incorporating this ‘affective 1075 
testimony’ (Clément & Dukes, 2017; Harris, 2019) as part of a general social appraisal in the ABC 1076 
approach is mandatory, and is in line with Manstead and Fischer’s original goals for the scope of social 1077 
appraisal (Fischer & van Kleef, 2010; Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson & Manstead, 2015). 1078 
 1079 
The introduction of affect as a means to control knowledge transmission can apply as much to deciding 1080 
to engage in an emotionally-charged ritual in traditional or ancient human societies, as it can to 1081 
chimpanzees approaching an unknown nut, experimentally introduced in their environment (Biro et al., 1082 
2003). In the latter case, we do not expect the added folklore, stories, and abstract values attached to 1083 
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the human rituals to appear, but the emotional connection to an unknown experience may well favor or, 1084 
on the contrary, force the disappearance of a given behavior present in the community, adding to the 1085 
ecological variables that already impact the maintenance of the behavior in the first place (Grund, 1086 
Neumann, Zuberbühler, & Gruber, 2019). The ABC approach can also add clarity to several contentious 1087 
issues related to animal culture. For example, there has been much debate on the type of conformity 1088 
present in animals (van Leeuwen, Kendal, Tennie, & Haun, 2015; Whiten & van de Waal, 2016). 1089 
Conformity is particularly challenging because it is founded on complex metarepresentational processes 1090 
(Gruber, et al., 2015). One may however argue that original studies of conformity (Asch, 1956) or 1091 
bystander effect (Latane & Darley, 1968) included affective statements by knowledgeable participants, 1092 
which influenced the way the naïve participants behaved. This affective dimension may well be at play 1093 
in animal conformity cases, offering a less cognitively-loaded account, which still does not deny the 1094 
reality of the phenomenon observed in non-humans.  1095 
 1096 
The ABC approach can also be proposed for complex species-specific cultural phenomena such as 1097 
language evolution in humans. Building on evolutionary approaches that aim to lower the cognitive 1098 
threshold for studying their occurrence in other species (for imitation learning in the acquisition of novel 1099 
words, see Fridland & Moore, 2014; for intentionality in communication, see Townsend, et al., 2017), 1100 
we believe that the ABC approach can provide a more accurate perspective on language evolution than 1101 
current models that heavily rely on cognitive mechanisms. The main issue for these approaches is how 1102 
to explain the occurrence of language conventions without relying on traditional descriptions such as 1103 
the one by Lewis (1969). Lewis claimed that for language conventions to occur, i.e., for words to have 1104 
the property of being context-independently meaningful, we all, as part of a language community, 1105 
indirectly committed to using the word in a certain way and we are actively aware of these agreements 1106 
(that is, member X of language community L knows that member Y of the same language community 1107 
also knows that word W means M and uses it in accordance with that meaning). Human language 1108 
conventions though are not infinitely stable, but dynamic; novel language conventions are introduced 1109 
through novel uses of signals by language users (e.g., a prime example consists of the use of novel 1110 
words used by adolescents, that can eventually become part of established dictionaries). According to 1111 
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Lewis, the novel use is detected by other members of the language community through grasping the 1112 
intentions involved on the speaker’s side when producing a word with a novel meaning. To grasp these 1113 
intentions, established research traditionally describes the context, previous meanings of the word, and 1114 
additional ostensive signals by the speaker, all of which are used as premises (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1115 
1995). The entire process is usually assumed to be highly cognitively loaded, making arbitrarily 1116 
meaningful signals and language conventions per se one of the defining and exclusive features of human 1117 
communication versus other animals’ (e.g. Scott-Phillips, 2015). Compared to these accounts, 1118 
evolutionary accounts consider that the level of cognitive requirements for language conventions to 1119 
appear and remain in circulation are too complex, especially when aiming to provide a narration of an 1120 
evolutionary continuum (Millikan 2005; Moore 2013). Millikan for instance claims that while a speaker 1121 
may intentionally start using a word in a novel way, a recipient, while not excluding it, does not need 1122 
to focus on the speaker’s intention; this is because the latter is rather interested in the use (or ‘function’ 1123 
in Millikan’s words) of this new word to describe the world (Millikan, 2005; for more discussion, see 1124 
Sievers, Wild, & Gruber, 2017). In addition, a word’s meaning remains in use (that is, the word has a 1125 
‘proliferation history’ in Millikan’s words) because using the word with its meaning fulfils this function 1126 
(Millikan, 2005), i.e. using the word grizzly bear, referring to the presence of the particular species of 1127 
bear, serves the function of warning and survival, which has allowed the variant to remain in the 1128 
population. This is opposed to other approaches that claim that words remain in use because of the 1129 
known intentions involved in all members of the language community (i.e. Lewis, 1969), and with that 1130 
complex mindreading capacities involved (i.e., inferring the intention used by communicator when 1131 
using a word in a novel way, see Bloom, 2002). 1132 
 1133 
While the Millikanian ‘function’ of a word is certainly an important factor for the proliferation, we 1134 
believe the actual proliferation mechanisms might be linked to the ascription of value for using a word 1135 
in a certain way (Sievers & Gruber, 2020). It is claimed that for young children to learn language 1136 
conventions – thereby guaranteeing the proliferation of the convention – complex learning (i.e., 1137 
imitation learning) and teaching processes are involved in grasping arbitrary meanings of words (Moore 1138 
2013). ASL may help explaining how these processes come about in a less cognitively challenging 1139 
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manner: communicators engaging with a certain object linked to the novel meaning of the signal ascribe 1140 
value to the object for the novel word use. For example, adolescent children may see several or one 1141 
particularly influential peer using a word in a certain context with a certain meaning, and ascribe value 1142 
to it, meaning that there is importance to this use of the word for the adolescent child. That is, the peer 1143 
ascribes value to the use by producing the word in the given context, and makes the adolescent drawn 1144 
to this way of usage. In a next step, for the adolescent child to gain more information about the concrete 1145 
usage and, with that, the meaning of the word, again affective states play an important role: facial 1146 
expressions as displays of affective states (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; but see Fridlund, 1994) are often 1147 
considered ostensive signals during communication (Wharton & Saussure, 2020). These ostensive 1148 
signals are important tools to direct attention to the relevant information for understanding the word use 1149 
and with that its precise meaning. In this manner the important peer may ‘teach’ the adolescent the use 1150 
of the word, in a non-active way.  1151 
 1152 
Overall, affective states and value ascription are an important part of introducing language conventions 1153 
(i.e. novel word uses), and the identification of these involved affective states or valuable objects are 1154 
central for other community members to grasp this new meaning. The ABC approach here may help 1155 
explain the exact learning and attention-getting processes that are involved. In particular, while not 1156 
excluding complex ToM-based processes for the establishment of novel convention, adopting an ABC 1157 
approach does not deny the possibility for less cognitively-centered processes. This is particularly 1158 
important while considering language evolution, for example, the different degrees of arbitrariness 1159 
found in animal signals, which may allow for an evolutionary continuous explanation for the appearance 1160 
of full-blown arbitrary meaningful signals such as human words, from less-arbitrary beginnings as can 1161 




In this article, we have argued that the current literatures on social learning and affective social 1166 
influence, for historical reasons more than apparent theoretical disagreements, have remained divided. 1167 
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Yet, besides the frustration of being unable to maneuver across disciplines concerned with a similar 1168 
object of study, we have argued that it is crucial to recognize striking commonalities. We have proposed 1169 
a novel ABC approach of social learning, including Affect, Behavior and Cognition, building on the 1170 
three major traditions that we have reviewed in the literature. Our attempts at reviewing these three 1171 
major domains have been necessarily patchy. For example, we have only superficially reviewed the 1172 
major debates in the social learning literature between animal and human social learning, which has 1173 
occupied much of the debate on the uniqueness of human culture over the last two decades. Yet, we 1174 
also believe that this debate has reached a stand-still, with scholars on both sides (animal culture 1175 
proponents and sceptics, respectively) unable to convince the others to join them at the theoretical level 1176 
(Gruber, 2016; Tennie, et al., 2009; Whiten, et al., 2009). Our proposal to include affect in the debate 1177 
can, we hope, unlock the stalemate, as well as contribute to the debates in the developmental literature 1178 
with respect to the (non-affective) cognitive achievement of infants and toddlers (Gredebäck, Astor, & 1179 
Fawcett, 2018; Heyes, 2017). 1180 
 1181 
Overall, we believe that scientists should strive to integrate affect as part of any social learning model, 1182 
as it is likely to always color one’s perception of one’s environment. Affect provides a continuum, from 1183 
uncontrollable tantrums present in babies of many species, to the faculty to manipulate, consciously or 1184 
not, the appreciation of a learner of a given object of its environment, whether animated or not. We 1185 
believe that the ABC approach thus not only provides a bridge between species, but also highlights that 1186 
any social learning process will be somehow influenced by its affect, as largely studied and 1187 
demonstrated in other domains by affective sciences. While we do not believe that animal and human 1188 
social learning theories have completely ignored affect, we believe the latter deserves a much more 1189 
central place in the debate, and we hope that our contribution will foster discussions between the three 1190 
major branches of social learning, as well as with other disciplines such as affective neurosciences (see 1191 
also Olsson, et al., 2020), that can lead to the reconstruction of the evolution of the mind as a product 1192 
of affect, behavior and cognition. In this respect, we have briefly described potential important 1193 
applications of the ABC approach, in providing a scaffold for the evolution of culture and language. 1194 
While not denying the uniqueness and achievement of our own species, we believe such an approach 1195 
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can be used as a starting point to determine how emotion and cognition kept interacting throughout our 1196 
evolution, rendering our cultures and communications unique in scope and nature. 1197 
 1198 
Notes: 1. Interestingly, this approach to motivation appears to depart from the usual use of the term in 1199 
emotion research where it refers to event-induced states of relatively short duration where one is 1200 
inclined to act or not to act (Frijda, 2010). 1201 
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Box 1  1812 
Understanding emotions in others’ actions 1813 
Humans are notorious for their ability to express and understand emotions (Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & 1814 
Scott, 2010; Scherer, 2005). Our understanding of emotions grows gradually; from an early onset 1815 
already identifiable in the first year of life, at the end of which infants are able to recognize positive and 1816 
negative facial expressions and to respond appropriately (Sorce, et al., 1985), to age 10 or 11 when they 1817 
can recognize most facial expressions (Pons, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2004). In the process, they also 1818 
understand the social underpinnings of emotions and will attribute the correct ‘emotion’ to a given 1819 
story (Saarni, 1979). While the universality of specific emotions is a continuous source of debate 1820 
(Crivelli, Russell, Jarillo, & Fernández-Dols, 2016; Ekman, 1992), the ability to recognize how 1821 
conspecifics relate to the objects in their surroundings is nevertheless very likely to be present in all 1822 
human societies suggesting that there is an evolutionary advantage to being able to do so. While being 1823 
able to understand immediately that a conspecific is scared (Olsson & Phelps, 2007), disgusted or 1824 
angry, there may be evolutionary benefits too in appreciating that someone is proud, enthusiastic or 1825 
interested (Mortillaro & Dukes, 2018). The concept of social appraisal (Manstead & Fischer, 2001) 1826 
highlights how a learner can use others’ appraisals of an object while appraising the object themselves. 1827 
In simple terms, we can learn how others evaluate the objects in the environment: we may learn that 1828 
an otherwise ignored object is in fact relevant, and then engage with it ourselves, we may also assume 1829 
that members of the same group feel the same way and prefer learning from them (Gruber, et al., 2019). 1830 
Observation of other people’s manifestations of their relation with an object and subsequent inferences 1831 
about how they feel towards the object, can inform the learner about how they should feel about the 1832 
object themselves and predict how the other might behave (Egyed, Király, & Gergely, 2013).  1833 
    1834 
According to appraisal theorists, emotions are the result of the goals and motivations that an individual 1835 
has on the other object (Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, 1836 
& Johnstone, 2001). Emotion can thus be directly seen in the action of the other and contextual (e.g. 1837 
bodily) information may be quasi-automatically integrated, presumably even before an emotion is fully 1838 
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identified for categorization (Frijda & Tcherkassof, 1997): in line with Dennett’s (1987) intentional 1839 
stance, to grasp the sense of relational activity, “merely requires that movements be viewed as behavior 1840 
– that is, as purposive, as movements related to the organism’s environment and as guided by aims in 1841 
relation to that environment” (Frijda & Tcherkassof, 1997, p.95-96).  1842 
 1843 
Social referencing is often described as comprised of two behavioral elements: initiating a look at the 1844 
adult and using adult’s emotional cues in guiding further actions (Walden, 1991). The focus on the 1845 
visual modality for emotion recognition likely results from the propensity of infants to pay special 1846 
attention to human faces, which may underlie their predisposition to learn about the world through a 1847 
caregiver’s face (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002). With development, looking at others 1848 
allows them to obtain crucial feedback on the situation. As described in the main text, infants use social 1849 
gaze to emotionally check in with their caregivers upon encountering a potentially dangerous situation, 1850 
such as an obstacle on their path, a barking dog or a spider. This process is not limited to humans, as 1851 
has been demonstrated in domesticated cats and dogs when dealing with humans within interspecific 1852 
social referencing protocols (Merola, Lazzaroni, Marshall-Pescini, & Prato-Previde, 2015; Merola, 1853 
Prato-Previde, & Marshall-Pescini, 2012).  1854 
 1855 
Additional emotion clues can be found in the vocal (Banse & Scherer, 1996) and tactile modalities 1856 
(Hertenstein, Keltner, App, Bulleit, & Jaskolka, 2006). Vocally communicated transmission may work 1857 
better in some contexts, particularly when vocal communication is the only way to transmit such 1858 
emotional information (Grandjean et al., 2005). This also opens experimental opportunities for 1859 
investigating emotion recognition in other species. Comparative work indeed often relies on field 1860 
experiments using vocal play-back, which offers a strong methodological approach in natural settings 1861 
to explore the connections between affect and the social world. For example, chimps show ‘surprise’, 1862 
in terms of longer orienting responses, when they have heard what they think is a lower-ranked member 1863 
challenge a higher-ranked member of the group (Slocombe, Kaller, Call, & Zuberbühler, 2010). Such 1864 
recognition is not limited to primates, with dogs having been shown to recognize both conspecific and 1865 
heterospecific (human) emotional content in vocalizations (Albuquerque et al., 2016). 1866 
